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 ‘We had to become criminals, to survive under communism!’: 
Testimonies of Petty Criminality and Everyday Morality  





Although communist propaganda frequently claimed that crime rates were negligible in 
Eastern Europe, a substantial informal economy developed during the latter decades of 
communist rule. Large numbers of citizens regularly engaged in a range of ‘petty illegalities’ 
including theft, underground trading and economic exchange, bribery and corruption. These 
activities were officially prohibited, but were widely accepted and tolerated in practice, both 
by ordinary citizens and state authorities. Drawing on written memoirs and original data from 
a series of oral interviews conducted in three former communist countries – the Czech 
Republic, Hungary and Poland – this chapter analyses popular motivations for engaging in 
petty economic crime under communism, providing some fascinating insights into the ways 
in which individuals internalised, interpreted and presented their own criminal behaviour, 
through the adoption of various ‘coping mechanisms’ to minimise the contradictions evident 
in personal accounts of life under the communist system and to justify and ‘normalise’ their 
own behaviour within it. The result is a complex and richly textured analysis of petty 






In the twenty five years that have passed since the collapse of communism across Eastern 
Europe, an increasing number of historians have realised the value of personal testimony as a 
source to enhance and enrich our understanding of the conditions, working and legacies of 
communist rule in the region. The former communist bloc has provided fertile ground for 
proponents of oral history and memory studies. The fall of communism ‘unleashed a tide of 
memories’, as the lifting of censorship restrictions allowed many people to speak openly 
about ‘how things really were’ for the first time and fuelled the writing and publication of 
diaries, memoirs and personal autobiographies reflecting upon the recent past.1 Increasingly, 
academic researchers from within and outside the former communist bloc have recognised 
the value of oral history and personal memoirs as the basis for innovative and informed 
academic studies.2 Beyond the academic sphere, we have also seen efforts to record and 
document personal testimonies on a larger scale. In many cases the internet provides an ideal 
medium for wider dissemination, with interview transcripts and recordings often made 
available online.3 
 
Early proponents of oral history methodology saw it as a means of providing evidence that 
could not be retrieved from more conventional sources and a way to uncover ‘hidden’ 
histories by gathering information, experiences and viewpoints from those who had been 
marginalised, neglected or excluded from ‘mainstream’ history. Today there is no shortage of 
textual sources available to historians researching communist Eastern Europe. Numerous 
archives have opened up to researchers in the post-communist period, but while these are an 
extremely valuable source of information, much communist-era documentation was distorted 
by ideology and subject to high levels of censorship and propaganda, often requiring 
historians to ‘read between the lines’ in much the same way as citizens remember doing 
during the years of communist rule. Personal testimonies can, therefore, provide a useful 
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supplement to official records. Oral history has also been harnessed as a method of revealing 
previously ‘hidden aspects’ of life behind the iron curtain, as scholars increasingly seek to 
create a broader spectrum of the lived experience of communism, by focusing on recording 
the thoughts and experiences of ‘the unorganised, quiescent majority’ of the population.4 
 
However, oral history has been subjected to considerable methodological scrutiny, giving rise 
to a number of ethical concerns and regulatory guidelines. Critics have challenged the 
accuracy and reliability of personal testimony as a historical source, citing the fallibility of 
individual memory, lack of neutrality, subjectivity and performativity of the narrator. Yet 
whereas certain aspects of oral interviews can be problematic in terms of their empirical 
function, they can also provide us with valuable insights that enhance rather than detract from 
their value as a historical source. Abrams argues that rather than approaching oral interviews 
as a simple data mine, historians should consider them as a complex narrative performance.5 
We should recognise that while interviewees may not always recount ‘the truth’, they will 
express ‘their truth’, telling us ‘not just what happened but what they thought happened’ and 
revealing much about how they have subsequently internalised and interpreted these events.6 
In this sense, the significance of oral research in former communist countries extends far 
beyond its role of ‘filling the gaps’ in official histories, serving as a means of illuminating 
and understanding the relationship between subjectivity, memory and totalitarianism.7  
 
Today, scholars recognise that the raw material of oral history consists not just of factual 
statements and literal narration, but in the significance of the oral narrative itself as an 
expression and representation of culture, memory and ideology, a multi-layered 
communicative event that can be analysed and interpreted to reveal hidden levels of 
discourse.8 This has important implications for historians, who must act as ‘intuitive and 
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imaginative interpreters’, analysing not just the words said (or not said) but also the language 
employed and the structures of explanation to ‘decode’ the deeper meanings embedded 
within individual testimonies.9 This approach poses new ethical challenges for historians, 
who often seek to reshape the original interview by constructing a ‘second level narrative’, 
which has the potential for misunderstanding, misinterpretation, and the imposition of a 
second level of subjectivity.10  
 
My own research into the informal economy in late-socialist central Europe has utilised 
information from a variety of sources, including official documentation, statistical data and 
media reports, but I have also drawn heavily on personal testimony, using written memoirs 
and evidence from a series of oral interviews conducted in three former communist countries 
– the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland – between 2004 and 2006. The initial aim of these 
interviews was to gather information to support my research into criminal networks in late-
socialist and early post-socialist Central Europe, and to obtain personal insights and original 
illustrative material. However, reconstructive cross analysis of these narratives has the 
potential to reveal a richly textured discourse relating to petty criminality and popular 
morality in late-communist central Europe. My research also required engagement with many 




Researching the Informal Economy: 
From the late 1960s, a substantial informal economy developed across the communist bloc, 
comprised of a range of semi-legal and illegal acts including undeclared private employment, 
moonlighting, small scale theft and pilferage from the workplace, underground market 
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trading, corruption and bribery. Grossman described the communist informal economy as 
comprised of economic activities which met at least one of the following criteria: (1) being 
directly on private account, whether conducted legally or illegally (2) being (to the actor) 
knowingly illegal in some substantial respect(s), while Los described how ‘while their 
etiquette and secondary characteristics may differ from country to country, as well as in 
urban and rural areas, these [informal] networks inevitably involve goods snatched from 
workplaces; private services rendered during work hours; private utilisation of state 
machines, tools or transport; producing goods ‘under the counter’; contraband and illegal 
trafficking’.11 These activities were officially prohibited and condemned by the regimes in 
power, but in practice they were widely accepted and tolerated by both ordinary citizens and 
by state authorities.  
 
The evidence suggests that virtually all citizens engaged in various ‘petty illegalities’ on an 
occasional, regular or – frequently – a daily basis. A survey conducted by the Economic 
Research Institute in Prague in April 1988 found that only two out of 600 respondents 
claimed they had never used illegal means to procure goods or services.12 Illegal economic 
exchanges also created ‘invisible incomes’, earnings not declared to the state for taxation. By 
1984 personal expenditure in Poland was 13 per cent higher than levels of registered income, 
while in Hungary ‘unofficial earnings’ were calculated to total as much as 100,000 million 
forints per annum (20 per cent of the total national income) with an estimated 75 per cent of 
families reliant on some form of ‘unofficial’ income.13 Corruption and bribery were also 
widespread, and although the corrupt nature of those in positions of authority (such as 
Communist Party officials and law enforcement officers) was particularly well documented, 
bribery occurred at all levels of exchange, often taking the form of ‘gifting’ or an ‘exchange 
of favours’ at lower levels. Although most individual acts of petty theft and illegal economic 
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exchange took place on a small scale, by the 1980s these ‘everyday crimes’ were so prevalent 
that their combined cost translated into significant losses for the increasingly struggling state 
economies. In addition to promoting popular acceptance of these illegalities, the informal 
economy also encouraged materialism and individual entrepreneurism, ‘capitalist values’ that 
were officially condemned by socialist ideology. Some studies even suggest that the 
expansion of the informal economy directly contributed to the collapse of communism.14 
 
The very nature of the informal or ‘underground’ economy means that relatively little reliable 
documentary evidence, records or statistical information exists. In fact communist-era 
political, law enforcement and media reports tended deliberately to downplay the extent of 
the informal economy. However, the prominent role that the shadow economy played in 
everyday life does feature in many autobiographical accounts. For example, Susan Shapiro 
recounts her own experiences of making corrupt payments ‘under the table’ to get a hotel 
room in Romania and obtaining meat and petrol coupons ‘through black market connections’ 
in Czechoslovakia during a visit to Eastern Europe during the 1980s, actions that led her to 
reflect that ‘every day in this part of the world, it seems that we are involved in a situation 
where we must do something illegal’.15 Janos Kenedi’s memoir Do It Yourself tells of how he 
was drawn into a ‘grey zone of criminality and moral ambiguity’ in Hungary as he attempted 
to build his own house.16 American sociologist Janine Wedel, who spent time as a doctoral 
researcher in Poland from 1982 to 1986, also draws heavily on personal insights and 




Conversations about Crime: Methodology and Ethical Considerations: 
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Personal testimony has played an important part in my own research. Data gathered during 
oral interviews was utilised as an important source to supplement the limited documentation 
available, as a method of exploring peoples’ motivations for engaging in petty economic 
crime and their experiences of the informal economy. While a relatively small number of 
individuals were sampled from the three countries that formed the basis of my research, 
reconstructive cross-analysis of their testimonies provides valuable insights into social 
attitudes towards petty criminality and perceptions of popular morality under late socialism. 
However, this required consideration of various ethical responsibilities, both in terms of the 
‘duty of care’ towards my interviewees and with regard to my own role as an ‘intuitive and 
imaginative interpreter’ of their testimonies. 
 
From 2004 to 2006, I conducted 38 oral interviews in total (14 in Poland, 12 in Hungary and 
12 in the Czech Republic) as part of my doctoral research into crime networks in late 
communist and early post-communist Central Europe. Almost all of the interviews took place 
in and around the capital cities of Budapest, Prague and Warsaw. The interviewees included 
individuals who had directly experienced and engaged in the informal economy and those 
who had been formally charged with preventing and prosecuting such criminal activities 
during the communist era. However, this distinction was not always mutually exclusive. For 
example, I had conversations with a former Hungarian border guard who admitted occasional 
cross-border smuggling and a Polish policeman who admitted he had taken bribes. Three 
people who were unable to meet with me in person also responded to some of my questions 
via email and during my fieldwork I also met with representatives from various organisations 
in the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland to discuss criminality and contemporary 




The age of the interviewees ranged from 28 to 57. There was a reasonably even gender split: 
25 of the 38 interviewees were male, but this was partly a result of the interviews I conducted 
with ‘authority figures’ (for example, police and border guards), which are traditionally male-
dominated services. Almost all of the interviews took place on a one-to-one basis, although in 
most cases an interpreter was also present to ensure a fuller and more accurate translation. As 
this was designed to be a broad, comparative study spanning three countries, I was unable to 
rely fully on my own language proficiency. A few interviews were also conducted in English. 
As far as possible, the interviews were conducted as open, relatively informal, semi-
structured conversations, although the conversations I had with those who still held positions 
of authority in state structures naturally tended to assume more formality. I had prepared a list 
of general questions to create a ‘skeleton structure’ for the interviews, but I adapted and 
diversified this depending on individual circumstances. Other than this, I tried to restrict my 
role to that of a facilitator, asking initial questions and making occasional prompts and 
interjections to seek clarification, additional details or to express general interest and 
encouragement. The majority of interviewees, while happy to speak to me, were not 
comfortable with an aural record of the conversation, so I relied largely on detailed 
handwritten notes I made during our conversations, which I then typed up as a transcript as 
soon as possible after completion of the interview.  
 
Personal testimony can be an extremely useful source for scholars studying various aspects of 
criminality. Oral histories play an important role in ‘humanising’ offenders within their wider 
social context and can also ‘reveal circumstances mainly hidden from the crime researcher 
who relies solely on quantitative or official sources – situations that were untrustworthy, 
places that were to be avoided, suspicious people not to be approached, crimes never reported 
to the authorities…’.18 However, criminal ‘confessions’ can be difficult to obtain, and there 
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are important ethical issues to consider if researchers encourage their interviewees to discuss 
behaviours that are generally considered to be illegal or immoral. During the conversations I 
had, many individuals admitted to law-breaking and involvement in questionable economic 
activities during the late-socialist period. This carried a level of personal risk, with the 
potential for negative consequences for the interviewees. If these admissions were made 
public, they may suffer social embarrassment, and risk losing respect from friends and family 
members. An existing or potential employer may perceive them as untrustworthy or 
dishonest, something which could be particularly problematic for those individuals who were 
still employed in post-communist politics or law enforcement. There may even be the 
potential for legal consequences: other people named during the interview could take issue if 
they considered what was said about them to be defamatory, or the interviewee may 
themselves become the subject of a criminal investigation. 
 
For this reason, when I initially conceived this project, I worried that it might prove difficult 
to convince people to talk to me about their experiences of the informal economy. In general, 
however, the people I met were extremely open and candid when discussing their personal 
involvement. Only four of the people I approached refused to speak to me at all, one of whom 
explained that he felt this would be ‘too dangerous for him’.19 This general openness could be 
explained by numerous factors: I was interested in learning about peoples’ experiences during 
the relative freedom and relaxation of the Brezhnev era rather than during earlier periods of 
more overt terror and repression; the communist system had since definitively ended, creating 
a clear break between ‘past’ and ‘present’ and during the time period that had since elapsed 
political, economic, social and legal changes had transformed conditions in all three countries 
beyond recognition. This context appeared to help interviewees to create and maintain a 
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distance between their present day selves and their past ‘communist selves’, in terms of their 
own behaviour, morals, values and outlook when constructing their narrative.  
 
Despite this ‘openness’ many interviewees only agreed to speak to me on condition of 
anonymity, so I agreed to use pseudonyms in any published work. For this reason, the names 
quoted here have been changed, although all other personal details remain accurate. It has 
long been accepted that historians have a duty to respect any assurances of confidentiality 
given to informants. However, this understanding has been challenged by the recent Boston 
College Case concerning ‘The Belfast Project’. This was a series of academic interviews 
conducted between 2001 and 2006, involving former members of the IRA and other militia 
groups involved in the Irish ‘Troubles’ (1960s-1990s), where 46 participants agreed to give 
interviews based on the understanding that recordings would be kept confidential until after 
their deaths. However, in December 2011 a US court ruled that despite this agreement, oral 
data should be handed over to British authorities investigating the 1972 murder of Jean 
McConville by the Provisional IRA, as criminal investigations should take priority over 
academic pledges of confidentiality, something which sets a dangerous precedent – both 
ethically and legally - for oral historians.20 . 
 
The nature of my research meant that it was particularly important to ensure I gained full, 
informed consent from all interviewees. At the outset of each interview, I discussed these 
issues with each participant, who then confirmed they were still happy to proceed. I was 
largely able to offer reassurance about any concerns, as overall the risk of any of the 
scenarios outlined above was low. In most instances, the interview focused on discussing 
semi-legal and small-scale ‘petty illegalities’ rather than more serious criminal offences. The 
activities discussed had taken place under a state system that no longer existed and legal 
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reforms in the years since 1989 meant that many of the laws that had previously been broken 
no longer applied.21 In my role as a historian rather than a criminologist or lawyer, the 
conversations were designed to take the form of a discussion rather than an interrogation, so 
while many interviewees made general admissions about their personal involvement in the 
informal economy and even referred to specific examples, precise details (such as times, 
dates, or names identifying individual underground market suppliers) were generally not 
included, and given the nature of the subject matter, I did not push them for this information, 
although this made ‘fact checking’ more problematic. The interview transcripts were to be 
held as a private academic resource by me, rather than made publically accessible via 
archival deposits or online, and all participants were guaranteed full anonymity if their 
interview was referenced by me in any published work.  
 
Finally, it is important to consider the ethical debates around the role and responsibilities of 
the historian, as interviewer and interpreter, by questioning how the interview dynamic may 
shape both the interviewee’s original narrative, and the historian’s own perceptions, 
interpretations and subsequent construction of a ‘second narrative’. It is widely 
acknowledged that the presence of an audience – comprised, in this instance, of the 
interviewer (myself) and various third parties assisting with translation – may encourage the 
‘performative’ aspect of oral testimony, influencing both narrative content and expression. 
This is true even if the dynamic is relaxed and informal, with minimum interference from the 
interviewer. Abrams believes that the oral interview is shaped by perceptions on both sides, 
as ‘two worlds, or subjectivities, are colliding’.22 This is particularly pertinent in this context, 
as my identity - as a young, female, ‘western’ historian, an ‘outsider’ who has never 
personally experienced life under communism - may have influenced the responses of my 
interviewees, on a number of different levels. Due to her experiences while conducting 
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research in Poland, Wedel concluded that her identity as a ‘westerner’ was a particular 
limitation, as ‘the mere presence of a foreign researcher will influence the observed facts’, 
encouraging miscommunication and role playing on both sides.23  
 
As Passerini noted, ‘when writing about the impact of an ideology, oral historians should not 
simplify and enjoy the ethical vantage-point that a capitalist democracy supposedly 
provides’.24 Due to my status as an ‘outsider’, there is also a danger of my – consciously or 
unconsciously - imposing ‘western’ norms about morality and criminality when interpreting 
the interview narrative, While complete objectivity is probably impossible, as far as possible 
I have tried to remain aware of this pitfall, and avoid it.  
  
 
‘We had to become criminals, to survive under communism!’: 
During my research, oral accounts about the prevalence of the communist informal economy 
largely confirmed the information available in written sources and the secondary literature, 
while also contributing some useful anecdotal evidence and original insights to my own 
study. In many ways, however, perhaps the most interesting aspect of these conversations 
was not what was said, or what was not said but how the interview respondents constructed 
their narrative when discussing and describing their experiences of, engagement with and 
attitudes towards the communist-era informal economy. On a surface level, the predominant 
narrative that emerged from my interviews was, in many respects, confused and 
contradictory. However, deeper narrative analysis can reveal much about the ways in which 
individuals internalised, interpreted and presented their own criminal behaviour under 
communism. It became apparent that many respondents had adopted various ‘coping 
mechanisms’ to minimise the contradictions evident in their accounts of life under communist 
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system and to justify and ‘normalise’ their own behaviour within it. Portelli suggests that 
three main modes of narrative exist within oral history: Institutional (‘It was the custom or 
the rule’); Communal (‘We did this’) and Personal (‘I did this’).25 Interestingly, all three of 
these narrative modes were clearly present throughout my interviews, and while they often 
converged, they were also juxtaposed to a degree. 
 
Economic Rationality - ‘The Survival Thesis’: By far the most common explanation that 
dominated the narratives of those I spoke to was that of economic necessity or ‘survival’. 
When asked about their motivations for participation in the informal economy, virtually all 
interviewees rationalised their illegal activities in practical terms, claiming they were required 
to turn to crime to maintain their standard of living in the face of deteriorating economic 
conditions.26 For example: 
 
We had to become criminals, to survive under communism! (Magda, 51, Warsaw, 
July 2004) 
 
We had to use the illegal economy to maintain our standard of living (Pawel, 42, 
Warsaw, July 2004) 
 
Everyone was a criminal … because of the economic shortages. We had to break the 
law every day, just in small ways, just to get by (Petra, 44, Prague, June 2005) 
 
Those who didn’t [use the informal economy]… were pushed to the margins of 




Several individuals also explained that they had engaged in the informal economy to secure 
the well-being of their families, with more than one interviewee quoting the popular 
communist proverb that ‘he who does not steal from the state steals from his own family’, 
thus suggesting that they had been willing to sacrifice their own moral integrity to provide for 
their loved ones. 
 
This ‘survival thesis’ as a rationale to explain or justify the preponderance of economic 
illegalities during the late socialist period has also been cited by other scholars. Rosner’s 
study The Soviet Way of Crime, based on interviews conducted with Russian émigrés in New 
York during the 1980s, classified the majority of people she encountered as ‘survivors’ or 
‘necessary criminals’ as they rationalised their involvement in the second economy as a 
means of providing a decent standard of living.27 Rose has also argued that the growth of the 
informal economy was fuelled by the inefficiency, corruption and general failings of the 
communist command economy.28 
 
There is considerable evidence to support the claim that people turned to informal supply 
networks for economic reasons. During the Brezhnev era (1964-1982), it has been estimated 
that the general cost of living across the East European bloc rose by 55 per cent more than the 
average increase in wages and by the 1980s the second economy was providing more than 
one-third of all goods and over half of all essential labour and services in Central Europe.29 
The argument that the rapid growth in the second economy during the latter decades of 
communism was fuelled by increasing economic problems has been well documented in 
personal testimonies, memoirs and official documentation from this period, with numerous 
descriptions of production delays, persistent shortages of goods and materials, lengthy 
waiting lists for a range of consumer goods and services (such as refrigerators, cars or 
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telephone connections), photographs illustrating long queues for ‘basics’ such as bread, meat 
and toilet paper outside state stores and descriptions of the many alternative supply and 
procurement networks that developed outside of the approved state sector. As one Polish 
citizen remarked during the early 1980s, ‘I never expect to be able to buy anything in state 
stores. I am actually happy when I find something!’30 
 
However, despite the well documented economic decline of the 1970s and 1980s, 
Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland were far from subsistence economies during this 
period. Strictly speaking, it was possible to ‘survive’ without engaging in illegal economic 
exchanges, although this would have been rather a miserable existence! But many researchers 
have suggested that relative deprivation can act as a sufficiently motivational element to 
foster deviant behaviour.31 Most of my interviewees admitted that they primarily used the 
second economy to acquire consumer goods and luxury items. This suggests that, certainly in 
urban areas, many illegal transactions were motivated by ‘greed’ rather than ‘need’ and the 
desire to improve ones’ living standards and have a ‘nicer life’ within the constraints of the 
socialist system rather than by survival at any basic level.32  
 
There are a number of ways in which this ‘survival thesis’ shaped oral testimony. It enabled 
interviewees to invoke institutional justification for their actions and also influenced their 
self-representation within their narration, identifying themselves as fundamentally good, 
honest, individuals who had been trapped in a bad system, emphasising their helplessness, 
lack of choice and their own lack of accountability.33 Most of my interviewees referenced 
institutional (economic) causes above individual agency, often presenting themselves as 
victims, as the blame for their own criminality was primarily laid at the feet of the state that 
had failed them. Passerini noted that, ‘a widespread attitude of victimisation can be found in 
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testimonies of people who lived under totalitarian regimes, expressed by laying the blame on 
power and on their own hopelessness’, and argues that this should not be surprising because 
‘with a coercive ideology comes collusion and implication in the regime’.34 However, 
narratives that emphasise institutional causes may also obscure individual agency, 
consciously or unconsciously. Even under totalitarian regimes, it is possible to perceive 
people as ‘knowing subjects’ who have the capacity to engage with and respond to structures 
in diverse ways.35  
 
Communal Acceptance of ‘Tolerated Illegalities’: Polish Sociologist Adam Podgrecky coined 
the term ‘dirty togetherness’ to describe the large scale communal acceptance of the late-
socialist informal economy.36 Many of my interviewees also highlighted communal 
acceptance as an important influence on their actions, emphasising that the ‘petty illegalities’ 
they engaged in were considered socially acceptable and generally tolerated, even by those in 
power:  
 
Judging by the law … we were all criminals back then (Robert, 49, Warsaw July 
2004) 
 
Practically everyone I knew used the underground market at that time (Jozsef S, 43, 
Budapest, August 2004).  
 
The notion of ‘social crime’ – that certain types of criminality may be deemed illegal by the 
ruling authorities but enjoy widespread communal support or acceptance in practice – is, 
therefore, a useful concept in understanding the development and workings of the second 




‘Social’ or ‘customary’ crimes are particularly likely to develop in an environment where the 
formal legal regulation of ‘acceptable’ behaviour is contested by popular consensus, in which 
case the majority of people within a particular community may combine actively to foster or 
simply turn a blind eye to activities which the state authorities regard as criminal but the 
community themselves do not perceive as immoral or harmful. This likelihood increases in 
situations where citizens feel high levels of distrust, fear and cynical attitudes towards formal 
law, making ‘respectable citizens’ more willing to engage in illegal and unfair practices.38 
This was certainly the case in late-communist Eastern Europe, where the rule of law was 
eroded from above as well as below. The subtle re-negotiation of the social contract during 
the Brezhnev era implicitly decriminalised a wide range of petty economic crimes to ease the 
failings of command economy and satisfy popular consumption in exchange for general 
acquiescence to continued communist rule. Millar described how these ‘tolerated illegalities’ 
would ‘frequently take place in plain view of police, citizens, bureaucrats and high officials’ 
leading to widespread contempt for the law.39 As Kosztolanyi claimed, under communism, 
‘the rule of law was continually undermined by the way the political regime functioned’.40  
 
By emphasising high levels of communal complicity in the informal economy, my 
interviewees were able to present their individual memories as a ‘socially shared’ experience, 
inhibiting social disapproval, ‘normalising’ their illegal behaviour and justifying their actions 
on the basis that ‘everyone else was doing it too’. As Kuhn explains, oral narratives allow 
public and private memories to intertwine, as an individual’s memories ‘extend far beyond 
the personal … into an extended network of meanings that bring together the personal with 




Political Protest and Resistance: The communist-era informal economy has also been 
explained as a means of protest against the regimes in power, ‘a special form of civil 
disobedience’ and a method of resistance against communism.42 Perceiving ‘tolerated 
illegalities’ as a form of protest and rebellion, providing a measure of ‘popular justice’ in 
response to unfair or illegitimate oppression, also relates to notions of social crime. Research 
into eighteenth-century England has depicted a ‘vast, blurred, middle ground between crime 
and proto-political protest’, fuelled by the exclusion of the masses from political 
representation and the fact that the ruling class were engaged in exactly the same ‘blurring of 
the legal boundaries’ themselves.43 Clear parallels can be drawn here with late-socialist era 
Eastern Europe. However, others disagree with this analysis, arguing the informal economy 
actually had the opposite effect, acting as a ‘social mollifier’ by channelling potentially 
dangerous political frustrations into consumerism.44 
 
As early as 1959 one report concluded that, ‘the feeling among ordinary people is that it is 
not immoral to cheat the state’.45 It is also significant that throughout the communist bloc the 
vast majority of petty theft and pilferage targeted state-owned places of employment. This is 
no doubt explained in part simply by the greater prevalence of goods and materials and in 
part by the fact that it was easier to dismiss this as a ‘victimless crime’, but may also serve as 
an indicator of deliberate, targeted protest against the regime. This theory is supported by 
another common socialist-era proverb: ‘The state robs me and I rob the state, so we both 
come out even’ (Andras, 32, Budapest, August 2004). In addition, the second economy was 
not only used to supply everyday goods and services in short supply, but also as a means for 
people to circumvent state censorship and access ‘anti-socialist’ items that were explicitly 





During my interviews, several individuals mentioned using the informal economy as a form 
of ‘resistance’ against communist oppression, characterising their involvement as ‘a way to 
fight back’ (Kryzstof, 36, Warsaw, July 2004) and ‘a way to get one over on the communists’ 
(Alexey, 31, Prague, June 2005). Six of the people I spoke to claimed to have used the 
underground market to obtain recorded copies of western music prohibited by state censors, 
three to acquire dissident literature and one to purchase Levi jeans. However, the overall 
impression I received suggested that, for most people, political protest appears to have come 
a distant second to that of economic advantage. At best, the second economy seems to have 
represented a rather ambivalent form of opposition, functioning primarily as a solution to 
economic dissatisfaction rather than any concerted, political strategy of protest or resistance 
towards the regimes in power. It is also worth considering that claims of ‘resistance’ could 
also be magnified by individuals to detract from their previous acquiescence to communist 
rule. As Passerini argued, admissions of conformity or passive acceptance by those who have 
lived under ‘coercive ideologies’ such as communism ‘may not sit comfortably’ with their 
present (post-communist) sense of self.46   
 
 
Popular Morality:  
Widespread acceptance and tolerance of informal and illegal activities can also provide useful 
insights into the moral state of a particular society’.47 The prevalence of the informal 
economy appears to have had a significant impact on shaping popular morality in late 
socialist Central Europe. As legality and morality increasingly diverged, a series of ‘moral 
guidelines’ evolved to regulate the ambiguous ‘grey area’ occupied by the informal economy. 
For example, while ‘stealing from the state’ was broadly considered as acceptable, stealing 
20 
 
from a fellow citizen was overwhelmingly viewed as unacceptable and subjected to popular 
condemnation.48 As one of my interviewees explained: 
 
Ok … from the strict legal point of view, I suppose there’s not much difference 
between a ‘thief’ and one who simply ‘takes something home’ from work. But for us, 
there was a marked distinction … one could never ‘take away’ something from a 
private home, not even a stranger’s. That would have been theft (Sabine, 40, Warsaw, 
July 2004).  
 
Interestingly, many individuals also distinguished between their own personal involvement in 
the informal economy and the activities of those they perceived as ‘the real criminals’, such 
as corrupt state authorities and professional underground market dealers.49 A couple of 
interviewees expressed the sentiment that ‘the real criminals back then were the ones in 
power’ (Magda, 51, Warsaw, July 2004 and Andras, 32, Budapest, August 2004), with the 
Communist Party referred to as a ‘mafia’ (Miroslaw, 37, Warsaw, July 2004). People were 
also keen to differentiate their motivations and behaviour from those of professional 
criminals and large-scale underground market suppliers. As Wedel noted, ‘A spekulant is 
often looked down upon, but one who buys goods from him for socially accepted ends is 
not’.50 This is also something that was confirmed in my interviews: 
 
We knew who the real suppliers where … who to go to, where and when, for certain 
things. But we didn’t really like to associate with them … They [underground 
marketers] were the real criminals and they effectively robbed us too! We were just 




Karstedt and Farrall argue that the ‘normalisation’ of illegal activities as socially acceptable 
activities  or ‘everyday crimes’ during the latter decades of communism enabled individuals 
to ‘discuss justifications and techniques of committing crimes … with considerable ease, 
creating a moral climate that encourages such types of behaviour’.51 On a surface level, my 
interviewees defended the prevalence of the communist informal economy as normal and 
morally acceptable. One respondent noted that, ‘these “crimes” were normal behaviour. We 
had no real feelings of embarrassment or shame. Few people even thought about the morality 
or ethics involved’ (Jozsef S, 43, Budapest, August 2004). Another simply stated that, ‘Back 
then, few people could afford to have high moral principles’ (Ewa, 36, Warsaw, July 2004). 
 
However, there is evidence to suggest that the psychological impact of ‘tolerated illegalities’ 
in central Europe was more complicated. As Wedel noted, an admission of participation in 
the informal economy tended to evoke feelings of both pride and shame in individuals; ‘pride 
in having ingeniously gamed the system [but] shame in having lowered oneself to do so’.52 
Janos Kenedi also describes how he experienced an internal struggle between ‘moral 
reluctance and economic well-being’. While he was initially ashamed of his mother’s 
willingness to use her ‘backdoor connections’ to acquire scarce goods and critical of the gulf 
that existed between ‘economic laws and public morals’ in communist Hungary, he realised 
that he must also be prepared to compromise his ‘moral superiority’ to attain a decent 
standard of living after he was cheated by someone over the sale of his flat.53  
 
During the latter decades of communist rule the second economy became so extensive that it 
spawned its own distinct vocabulary, culture and etiquette. While cold, hard, cash-based 
corruption did exist, at lower levels much of the informal economy operated around a mutual 
exchange of favours, further blurring the lines of illegality and morality. Kenedi recounts 
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‘navigating the thickets of corruption and influence’ to acquire the requisite products for his 
house build, being prepared, where appropriate, to ‘slip a few banknotes into a greasy palm’ 
but also describing how the informal economy was carefully regulated by rules of social 
etiquette: ‘“I should be very grateful”, I say to the shop assistant. I can’t just say “here’s a 
hundred”’. 54 Wedel also emphasised the importance of informal etiquette: ‘Money must be 
offered with the greatest of care. The party proposing it must emphasise that it has nothing in 
common with a bribe. It is “gratuitous” or un-remunerated’.55  
 
Many ‘petty illegalities’ were essentially ‘de-criminalised’ by popular discourse, and my 
interviewees tended to speak using the imprecise and ambiguous expressions that were 
generally used to refer to informal economic activity. Rather than stealing people spoke of 
‘acquiring’ or ‘getting’ items; rather than bribery they talked about giving ‘gifts’, ‘tokens’, 
‘gratuities’ or ‘thanksgiving money’ and rather than illegal economic exchange people spoke 
about ‘settling’ or ‘arranging’ matters.56 The psychological impact that this expression had 
was illustrated by one Polish woman, who remembered how, during the communist era: ‘[the 
payment of gratuities] was more on the level of a kind of mutual goodwill, a kind of 
assistance, while “bribe” was an ugly word and refers to an ugly business’.57 Using this 
vocabulary implicitly helped people mentally to ‘de-criminalise’ their involvement in such 
activities and ‘normalise’ their behaviour, both internally and in the eyes of their social peers. 
Fifteen years later, it also enabled my interviewees psychologically to distance themselves 
from their own illegal conduct, verbalising their ‘crimes’ without directly confronting the 






Although communist propaganda frequently claimed that crime rates in Czechoslovakia, 
Hungary and Poland were negligible, the evidence suggests that during the latter decades of 
communist rule increasing numbers of citizens were turning to the informal economy where 
they were engaging in a range of ‘petty illegalities’ including petty theft, underground market 
trading, bribery and corruption. These activities were officially prohibited, but in practice 
they were widely accepted and tolerated, both by ordinary citizens and state authorities. 
Personal memoirs and oral testimonies provide a valuable resource for historians, helping to 
bridge the gap between propaganda and reality and providing interesting insights into popular 
perceptions of the informal economy. 
 
The dominant discourse to emerge from the oral interviews I conducted was economic. The 
vast majority of interviewees cited relative deprivation and the desire to achieve a better 
standard of living for themselves and their families as the primary factor that had motivated 
their involvement in the informal economy, although the tendency to blame institutional 
failings for their former actions could also be perceived as a way to reduce their individual 
accountability. Wider communal complicity in these ‘tolerated illegalities’ was also clearly 
considered to be an important factor. Presenting the informal economy as a socially shared 
experience implied moral reinforcement, justification and communal support for individual 
involvement. While a small number of interviewees also discussed the informal economy in 
terms of political protest and resistance to communist-era repression, this argument was much 
more ambivalent.  
 
Many interviewees also emphasised the ‘normalisation’ of their involvement in the informal 
economy, but there was some evidence of deeper cognitive dissonance. Karstedt and Farrall 
suggest that, ‘even if unscrupulous and unfair behaviour appears to be “normal” it is still seen 
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by most offenders and victims as behaviour in need of proper justification’.58 This can be 
seen in attempts to ‘decriminalise’ the informal economy through language, social etiquette 
and popular morality, coping mechanisms designed to minimise culpability by repressing, 
neutralising or distancing individual agency. The result was the production of a complex and 
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